Between the late nineteenth century and the 1960s, social theorists argued that economic development was inversely associated with complex family forms. The idea seems to have originated with Frédéric Le Play, who wrote in 1872 that stem families were disappearing "among the working class populations subject to the new manufacturing system of Western Europe" (Silver 1982: 260) . Durkheim (1888) expanded on Le Play's interpretation, stressing the loss of specialized functions of the family and weakening of kin ties with the growth of social differentiation (Lamanna 2002: 61) . Burgess (1916) generalized the theory that the nuclear family emerged as a consequence of industrialization, and by the middle of the twentieth century, the idea that simple nuclear families were functionally adapted to industrial society became a fundamental tenet of sociological thought (Ogburn 1933; Davis 1941; Parsons 1944) . Goode (1963: 6) , reflecting that consensus, wrote that "wherever the economic system expands through industrialization . . . extended kinship ties weaken, lineage patterns dissolve, and a trend toward some form of the conjugal system generally begins to appear." Policy analysts discussing changes in the living arrangements of the aged in the first half of the twentieth century stressed the importance of the declining importance of agriculture and the rise of industrial wage labor. The creators of the Social Security system-the landmark U.S.
old age support program, adopted in 1936-routinely justified the need for assistance in terms of the decline of farming and the flight of the younger generation to the cities (Eliot 1961; Clague 1961; Brown 1969; Helvering v Davis 301 U.S. 619 [1937] ). Mid-twentieth century literature on aging frequently raised the same points to explain the increasing tendency for the aged to reside alone (e.g. Burgess 1960; Cowgill 1974; Nimkoff 1962) .
A revisionist paradigm emerged in the 1960s. Laslett and Harrison (1963) discovered that only a tenth of households in the seventeenth-century village of Clayworth included extended 1 kin-a fraction almost identical to that reported by the 1961 census of England and Wales.
Laslett and his colleagues soon demonstrated that Clayworth was not an anomaly; there was similar evidence for many other pre-industrial villages (Laslett 1965 (Laslett , 1972 . Over the next two decades, Laslett's followers elaborated a theory that Northwestern Europe and North America had, from a very early date, a unique family system characterized by nuclear family structure, neolocal late marriage, and a high proportion never marrying (Hajnal 1982; Laslett 1983; Reher 1998 ).
Proponents of the exceptionalism theory argue that that in Northwest Europe and North
America-especially England and its colonies-children universally established new households when they got married, leaving the parents alone. According to this interpretation, elderly persons only resided with their children in cases of poverty or infirmity. In these circumstances, aged parents would move into their children's household because they could no longer support themselves (Hareven 1994 (Hareven , 1996 Kertzer 1995) . Exceptionalism advocates maintain that these "weak family" patterns were unique to Northwest Europe and North America, and the rest of the world had "strong family" systems with much higher levels of intergenerational coresidence (Reher 1998; Hartman 2004; Hajnal 1982) . Despite extensive criticism of the methods and measurements used by Laslett and his followers (e.g. Berkner 1972, 1975; Ruggles 1987 Ruggles , 1994 Ruggles , 2003 , the hypothesis of Northwest European and North American exceptionalism remains the dominant interpretation (Thornton 2005) . This paper exploits a vast collection of newly-available census data from 92 censuses of 29 countries around the world between 1850 and 2006. My goal is to begin to systematically assess cross-temporal and cross-national variation in the living arrangements of the aged. The family patterns of the aged are relevant to the European exceptionalism hypothesis. All things 2 being equal, one would expect that populations with weak nuclear family systems and neolocal marriage would have a higher percentage of aged persons residing alone or with just their spouse than would strong-family societies in which stem families or joint families predominated. Accordingly, I compare living arrangements of the aged in nineteenth-century Northwest Europe and North America with those of both developed countries and developing countries in the second half of the twentieth century, with a basic set of controls for economic development and demographic conditions.
The results suggest that nineteenth-century Northwest Europe and North America were not exceptional with respect to these measures. With simple controls for economic development, coresidence of the aged with kin and others in the historical data from the designated weak family areas appears very similar to that from strong family areas. This is not to say that the hypothesis of the Northwest European family pattern is entirely mistaken; it does appear, for example, that at least two of the countries examined did have significantly distinctive marriage patterns. Examination of the living arrangements of the aged, however, failed to uncover the exceptional families of historic Europe.
Data
This study is based on census microdata from three sources. The North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP 2006) 
Measures
Cross-sectional household-level measures of family complexity-such as those used by Laslett and his followers-are highly sensitive to demographic conditions, and therefore inappropriate for comparative analysis of populations with substantially differing demographic behavior. In populations characterized by high fertility and mortality, there are few elderly persons, and therefore only a small percentage of households have the potential to include elderly kin (Ruggles 2003) . In societies that also have late marriage and long generations-such as those of historic Northwestern Europe-the potential for multigenerational households is especially constrained; in many populations, the average grandchild was born when the grandparents were in their mid-60s. Thus, the potential for multigenerational households in preindustrial Northwestern Europe was sharply constrained (Ruggles 1987 (Ruggles , 1994 (Ruggles , 2003 .
4
One can minimize the impact of demographic conditions on family structure by measuring coresidence from the perspective of the aged. The great advantage of this approach, compared with cross-sectional household-level measures, is that we need not account for variations in the availability of elderly kin. That does not, however, mean that demographic conditions have no impact on the living arrangements of the aged.
1 To minimize the confounding effects of variation in demographic behavior, this analysis focuses on two measures of living arrangements of the aged: percent residing alone or with spouse only, and percent residing with children age 18 or older.
2 1 In low-fertility populations the aged have fewer children with whom they can reside, and some demographers have suggested that this may help explain the low levels of intergenerational coresidence in economically developed countries (Kobrin 1976; Soldo 1981; Wister and Burch 1983) . There is some evidence that the impact of fertility on coresidence is relatively small. In populations where coresidence of the aged is the norm, it appears to be insensitive to the number of surviving children (Knodel et al. 2000; Smith 1986; Ruggles 1994 see also Elman and Uhlenberg 1995); moreover, the net effects of fertility decline on long-term change in elderly coresidence with children in the United States were negligible (Kramarow 1995; Ruggles 1994 Ruggles , 1996 . Although fertility decline does have implications for the living arrangements of the aged, the available evidence therefore generally suggests that the level of fertility is not the critical factor for coresidence, although as noted in the text fertility limitation has important implication for the age of the children.
2 Two of the most widely-used measures of the living arrangements of the elderly are percent living alone and percent living with children. Both of these measures are sensitive to changing demographic conditions, and should be modified to maximize comparability. In populations without conscious fertility limitation, women bear children late in life. In many of those populations, husbands tend to be significantly older than their wives. Accordingly, in such societies, men in their late sixties often have minor children still living at home. This is not a residence decision; the children are coresiding with their elderly fathers only because they are not yet old enough to leave home. In low-fertility societies with early termination of childbearing, this is unlikely to occur, especially since most such populations tend to have narrower age gaps between spouses. Accordingly, to appropriately compare intergenerational coresidence of the aged across countries with differing patterns of fertility limitation, it is important to exclude residence with minor children.
The percentage of elderly living alone is influenced by patterns of mortality and nuptiality. In all populations, the overwhelming majority of currently-married elderly reside with their spouse. The availability of a spouse is affected by a variety of demographic factors such as celibacy, age intervals between spouses, and mortality. In general, developing countries have significantly lower proportions of aged with surviving spouses than do developed countries, and 5
In theory, one would expect that the percentage residing with adult children should be a better indicator of the Northwest European family pattern than would the percentage residing alone or with spouse only. In practice, however, there may be little advantage to the direct measure of coresidence; it is more complicated to construct the variable on residence with adult children, and it could be subject to greater measurement error because of variations among the censuses in variable coding and question wording.
The analysis measures economic development as the percentage of men age 18 to 64 engaged in agricultural work. Agricultural employment is virtually the only economic measure consistently available for every dataset under analysis, but it is a key measure. Elsewhere, I have argued that agricultural employment of the younger generation was the key determinant of changes in intergenerational coresidence in the United States (Ruggles 2007 ).
I also assessed the impact of two key demographic measures: the percent of the population aged 65 or older, and the percentage of each sex ever married at age 45-54. The percent of persons aged 65 or older is closely inversely correlated with fertility and mortality levels: in populations with high fertility and morality, the percentage of elderly persons is low.
Some demographers have also suggested that a high percentage of elderly in the population also may undermine the norm of intergenerational coresidence (Levy 1965:49; Kobrin 1976:136; cf. Burch 1967; Ruggles 1987) . The percent ever marrying is relevant because celibacy directly affects the availability of kin for coresidence, and it is relevant in this context because nonmarriage was fairly high in some of the countries of Northwestern Europe.
they therefore have less opportunity to reside alone. Accordingly, instead of measuring the percentage of elderly residing alone, I focus on the percentage residing alone or with a spouse only. and percent of each sex never marrying-somewhat reduces the effect of farming but produces substantially better-fitting models.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the predicted percent of aged in each living arrangement against the observed percent, based on the full models (2, 4, 6, and 8). If Northwest European and North American families were truly distinctive, we would expect that the observed percentage residing alone or with spouse only would be substantially greater than the predicted percent; that is, those should fall significantly below the diagonal in Figure 5 . The only nineteenth-century Northwest European or North American censuses that fall below the diagonal are two of the Norwegian censuses, and only one of those significantly deviates from the line. In Figure 6 , we would expect countries conforming to an exceptionally neolocal nuclear family system to have less intergenerational coresidence than would be predicted, and therefore to fall above the diagonal.Again, among the nineteenth century observations only Norway appears to conform at all to the expected pattern; moreover, although all three Norwegian censuses are above the diagonal for both men and women, none of these cases can really be described as outliers.
Discussion Goody (1996: 17) argued that the sharp distinction drawn by Hajnal (1982) and others between the Northwest European family and the rest of the world "overstresses the actual the Norwegian data are correct, however, however, it would be more accurate to describe the family patterns of these countries as "typical" rather than as "exceptional."
The argument of Laslett, Hajnal and others that preindustrial Northwest Europe was exceptional drew the comparison to the rest of the world at the time; no one compared preindustrial Europe to late-twentieth century developing countries. One way to rescue the hypothesis would be to imagine a scenario under which the less-developed countries of the world at some point in the distant past all had "strong" family systems, but by the second half of the twentieth century these had all weakened to the point that they appear identical to the "weak"
family systems of nineteenth-century Northwestern Europe and North America. Such a scenario, however, seems unlikely. The best data we have suggests that there has been little change in coresidence in the least developed countries during the past several decades, so the weakening of the families of the developing world would have had to occur in the mid-twentieth century or
earlier (Ruggles and Heggeness 2008).
There is another possible interpretation that could rescue the exceptionalism hypothesis.
Perhaps, Europe really did have a unique system of neolocal marriage, but also had a unique system of "nuclear reincorporation" under which large numbers of elderly moved into their children's homes when they became unable to care for themselves (Kertzer 1995) . Under this scenario, even though the living arrangements of the elderly in nineteenth-century Northwest
Europe appear identical to those in other parts of the world, they would still be distinctive because they were formed when dependent parents moved in with their children, rather than by children remaining in their parental home. I have argued elsewhere (Ruggles 2003 (Ruggles , 2007 that there is compelling evidence contradicting this hypothesis in the United States. In Canada, Great Britain, and Norway-like the United States and most other countries-the great majority of intergenerational families were headed by the older generation. This makes the nuclear reincorporation hypothesis strained at best; one would have to imagine that when the dependent elders moved in with their children, they would automatically assume the household headship.
I prefer the simplest and most obvious interpretation: the family system in Northwestern Europe and North America was essentially similar to that in the rest of the world. 5 As in the rest of the world, when families had a farm, at least one child usually remained at home after reaching adulthood. Farmers who reached advanced ages could needed help with heavy work, and the younger generation eventually inherited the land. Growing commercialization and industrialization in the nineteenth century, however, meant that fewer families had farms.
Moreover, young people were attracted off farms by the high wages and independence offered by jobs in large-scale commerce, manufacturing, and transportation. Thus, coresidence of the aged began to decline. 6 5 I am referring to the argument about living arrangements only. The Northwest European marriage pattern is real, and is reinforced by the new census data. Age at marriage was very late in Norway. Among the twentieth-century developing countries included in this analysis, only South Africa had as late marriage as nineteenth-century Norway. Age at marriage was also comparatively late in nineteenth-century Canada and Great Britain, and celibacy was also relatively high in all three countries. 
